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Abstract
To test whether firms behave consistently with international law prohibiting
anonymous incorporation, we conducted a global audit study and field
experiment, using data from 1639 incorporation firms in 176 countries. We
requested anonymous incorporation and randomly assigned references to
international law, threat of penalties, norms of appropriate behavior, or a
placebo. We find a substantial number of firms willing to flout international
standards and show that those in OECD countries proved significantly less
compliant with rules than in developing countries or tax havens. Firms in tax
havens displayed significantly greater compliance and were sensitive to
experimental interventions invoking international law.
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INTRODUCTION
In the fall of 2014, Russian nuclear executive Vadim Mikerin was
decoyed by a fake car alarm into leaving his Washington, DC-area
office to be whisked away by US law-enforcement agents. They were
attempting to coerce Mikerin to serve as an undercover mole in a
probe of suspected kickbacks and bribery involving the sale of
Russian uranium in the US (Schectman, 2015). Mikerin was taken
to a ‘‘war room’’ equipped with recording devices and radio
transmitters and festooned with diagrams of his alleged dealings
with Russian nuclear company executives through shell corpora-
tions. Mikerin was suspected of participating in schemes to
facilitate and hide bribes and kickbacks paid to various officials
by sending them through shell companies and secret bank
accounts in Latvia, Switzerland, and Cyprus.
While this example may seem as if it were lifted from the plot of a
spy novel, the true story underscores that the use of shell
corporations often enables illicit and nefarious activities. Although
shell companies can serve legitimate legal purposes, they have
often been associated with bribery, money laundering, tax evasion,
and drug trafficking.1 The use of shell companies created headlines
in early 2016 when the Panama Papers scandal revealed how
extensively they were being employed by heads of state and the
wealthy.2 Because of these problems, the question arises as to
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whether differences in legal institutions and finan-
cial regulation cross-nationally might cause
changes in incorporation patterns, which is the
first node in corporate governance, and whether
those domestic institutions might also condition
the effects of international standards on firm
behavior.
This moves the focus of concern to global
corporate governance, where there is a need to
better understand the ‘‘conflict, convergence, coop-
eration and competition among legal systems,
institutions, actors and rules’’ (Wood, Abbott,
Black, Eberlein, & Meidinger, 2015: 334). Global
corporate governance adds extra layers of complex-
ity to single-country contexts and has thus required
the creation, proliferation, and stabilization of new
governance systems transnationally (Djelic &
Quack, 2003). Sugathan & George (2015) found
that the corporate governance effectiveness and the
quality of country-level governance infrastructure
influence the profit shifting of foreign firms out of
host countries. Globerman & Shapiro (2003)
reported that countries that achieve effective gov-
ernance are more likely to receive foreign direct
investment from the United States. Hiller et al.
(2011) related evidence that various country-level
governance mechanisms significantly affect R&D
investment including strong law enforcement,
effective board control, and a bank-based financial
system.
Many years ago, Hoskisson, Eden, Lau, & Wright
(2000) identified domestic legal, financial, and
political institutions as critical in influencing
strategies that transnational businesses adopt. Since
then, a consensus has developed among interna-
tional management scholars that institutions must
be considered alongside transaction costs,
resources, and corporate governance/agency theory
(Kostova, Roth, & Dacin, 2008; Meyer, Estrin,
Bhaumik, & Peng, 2009; Peng, Wang, & Jiang,
2008; Wright, Filatotchev, Hoskisson, & Peng,
2005). Of course, the assertion that institutions
matter does not provoke controversy; the key
question is how and why they matter, especially
across varying national contexts (see Peng et al.,
2008).
Individuals and companies must navigate both
formal and informal institutions as they do busi-
ness abroad. Formal institutions include the legal,
taxation, and developmental policies of a country
(Redding, 2005). Informal institutions are networks
and nested organizations influenced by local cul-
ture and accepted norms (Leung, Bhagat, Buchan,
Erez, & Gibson, 2005). Institutions therefore pro-
vide the context, or the formal rules and informal
norms, that organize and govern individual, non-
governmental organizational, and business interac-
tions (Teegen, Doh, & Vachani, 2004). Domestic
institutions in some countries may encourage or
facilitate practices (e.g., anonymous incorporation)
that the domestic institutions of other countries
may deter or prohibit altogether. Scott (1995: 33)
thus describes institutions as the ‘‘regulative, nor-
mative, and cognitive structures and activities’’ that
create meaning and stability for actions and behav-
iors. Therefore institutions broadly define society
by forming, in the words of Douglas North, ‘‘the
rules of the game’’ (Meyer & Peng, 2005; North,
1990). It is within institutional constraints – both
formal and informal – that firms pursue their
interests (Ingram & Silverman, 2002).
However, there is a general consensus in inter-
national business studies that too little is known
about how institutional contexts differ cross-na-
tionally and how variance in context channels
constrains business activities from country to
country (Cantwell, Dunning, & Lundan, 2010;
Peng et al., 2008; Redding, 2005). In an attempt
to contribute to a better understanding of the
variation in institutional contexts globally, in this
article we categorize countries into multiple broad
types whose formal and informal institutions dif-
ferently affect how new businesses can be legally
incorporated – in ways that carry large implications
for firms’ compliance with international rules. We
do this through an audit study with accompanying
field experiment that offers strong causal inference
coupled with high naturalism or ecological validity
(see Chatterji, Findley, Jensen, Meier, & Nielson,
2016).
The focus of the study is the creation of shell
corporations internationally. Shell companies are
legal entities that typically do not produce sub-
stantive products or services.3 They may be created
by private individuals for legitimate purposes, often
as holding companies. However, shell corporations
may also be used to obscure the real owner of assets
or the controlling party behind financial transac-
tions. This kind of company is thus very different
from the typical multinational corporation of pop-
ular imagination and most international business
research. Shell companies are almost always pri-
vately held, not publicly listed.4 As largely passive
holding entities, they are indifferent to profit and
loss. Because they produce no substantive good or
service, their directors and other officeholders are
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formally exercising legal duties on behalf of the
individual owner, not performing any practical
management function. They are the first node in
corporate governance as limited liability entities, in
contrast to the unlimited liability of partnerships or
sole proprietorships. As such, incorporation should
be a central issue in management research.
The challenge arises when individuals seek un-
traceable incorporation, particularly internation-
ally, in which the beneficial (real) owner of the
shell company cannot be identified. Shell compa-
nies whose real owners cannot be discovered may
enable a slew of financial crimes. In response to this
issue, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF, 2016),
an international organization created by the
world’s leading economic powers, was created to
promote and enforce corporate transparency stan-
dards worldwide. These standards, now accepted by
180 countries and instantiated in a variety of
international conventions and laws, prohibit
untraceable shell companies by requiring that
governments must be able to ‘‘look through’’ such
legal persons to find the real individual or individ-
uals in control, in other words, the beneficial
owner.
However, there is a demand for untraceable shell
corporations that is in direct tension with the FATF
rules. Moreover, the FATF does not audit the
intermediary firms – corporate service providers
(CSPs) – that create shell companies in member
countries to learn if corporate transparency stan-
dards are actually being followed in practice.
Rather, they assess domestic laws to verify that
they harmonize with FATF rules. This gives rise to a
potential disconnect between international rules,
domestic institutions through informal norms and
formal laws, and firm behavior, which is at the
heart of this study. Hence the crux of this article is a
precise set of tests concerning the effects of infor-
mation regarding international institutions on
incorporation services’ conduct, and subgroup tests
of how domestic institutions condition or moder-
ate firms’ actions in response to information about
the global rules. The subgroup tests by country type
provide precise measurement of the effects of
differences in institutional context on compliance
with global rules. The subgroup tests can thus
reveal variation in treatment effects induced by the
experimental interventions across different cate-
gories of country institutional environments.
In this manuscript, we first consider how well
international FATF standards have been imple-
mented at the national level with a comparison to
incorporation practices as measured in our study.
In this, we demonstrate that the grades issued to
countries by the FATF in their periodic reviews do
not correlate particularly well with the findings on
cross-national compliance from our audit study,
which is the first global assessment conducted at
the firm (corporate service provider) rather than
country level. With this discrepancy as back-
ground, we then outline theoretical ideas that
may provide some explanation for why firms might
comply or fail to comply with international stan-
dards. These ideas include simply making firms
aware of regulations, as expected in a managerial
international law approach, as well as highlighting
the consequences or appropriateness of certain
behaviors.
For the audit study, researchers adopted personas
as putative consultants seeking ‘‘confidential’’
incorporation, and 2161 requests were sent to
1639 corporate service providers in 176 countries.
A central goal was to uncover global levels of
compliance with international standards. In the
audit study, we show that levels of compliance are
not high, and sometimes troublingly low. Observa-
tionally, we find substantial firm-level non-compli-
ance globally, and in investigating the effects
within different country groups, we find that firms
in tax haven countries were significantly more
compliant with transparency standards compared
to CSPs in OECD countries and developing nations.
This is the study’s first evidence that different types
of countries evince significantly distinct institu-
tional contexts for incorporation.
As part of the audit study we embedded a field
experiment by randomly assigning information
regarding FATF standards, including a prompt
noting the rules on identification documents, a
warning that there might be legal penalties, and an
invocation of norms of appropriate behavior. The
experimental results indicated few treatment effects
for the different international law information
conditions across the global sample. However,
again providing strong evidence for the importance
of institutional context, while CSPs in developed
and developing countries proved largely indifferent
to the information prompts about standards com-
pared to a neutral placebo, firms in tax havens
displayed significantly higher sensitivity to the
treatment conditions. This suggests pronounced
cross-national heterogeneity in domestic institu-
tions’ conditioning effects on firm behavior when
potential violations of international standards are
encountered. Firms in tax havens responded
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markedly to prompts invoking international law,
indicating that the institutional context for incor-
poration is very different for this type of country
compared to wealthy developed and poorer devel-
oping nations.
The research design and analysis plan were pre-
registered with an interdisciplinary research con-
sortium (www.egap.org) prior to the study’s exe-
cution, and the plan described the inclusion of
country type as a blocking criterion. Therefore this
subgroup analysis is prescribed as best practice in
experimental methods and should alleviate con-
cerns about post hoc ‘‘fishing’’ for significant
results. The results offer suggestive evidence that
variation across institutional forms captured by
country type likely affects firm behavior and mod-
erates the effects of varying information about
standards – all dynamics in need of follow-up
research. In what follows, we articulate the context
for the study, detail the research design, and pre-
sent our results.
FORMAL LAW VERSUS ACTUAL PRACTICE
In 1989, the G7 countries established the Financial
Action Task Force (hereafter FATF) to combat
money laundering by promoting financial trans-
parency, including corporate transparency. This
organization developed key recommendations rec-
ognized as the standard for battling money laun-
dering and terrorist financing. Aside from the G7,
the FATF now includes all members of the G20 and
a large majority of the OECD countries. Nearly
every other country is a member of regional FATF
associate bodies committed to upholding FATF
standards. Although the FATF itself only produces
soft law, codified in 40 Recommendations, its rules
have been explicitly endorsed by the United
Nations Security Council, incorporated within
World Bank and International Monetary Fund
standards, and written into a range of international
hard law conventions. Three of these Recommen-
dations have been the most important for improv-
ing corporate transparency through identification
of the beneficial owner.
The first (#5), deals with Customer Due Diligence
in mandating that banks establish the identity of
all account holders, including the identity of the
owners of companies that hold corporate accounts.
The second (#12) imposes the same Customer Due
Diligence requirements on entities such as casinos,
real estate agents, lawyers, and, crucially for our
purposes, the corporate service providers that set up
and sell shell companies. The third relevant rec-
ommendation (#33), mandates that governments
be able to find the real (beneficial) owner of all
companies in stating that ‘‘countries should ensure
that there is adequate, accurate and timely infor-
mation on the beneficial ownership and control of
legal persons that can be obtained or accessed in a
timely fashion by competent authorities’’ (FATF,
2013: 22).5
While the problem of untraceable shell compa-
nies has attracted renewed attention from the G7,
G20, and other bodies in the wake of recent
financial crises, efforts have been devoted to better
enforcement of the FATF’s basic rule on the trans-
parency of companies first laid down in 2003,
rather than instituting new standards. As a state
rather than federal responsibility, incorporation
standards have been largely constant in the US.
The EU and Britain introduced important new
regulations on corporate transparency in 2015,
but the basic goal remains meeting the FATF rule
quoted above on identifying beneficial owners.
While it is important for a country to have
official laws regarding specific requirements for
incorporation, such laws are generally not very
useful if they are not followed in practice (see, for
example, Allred & Park, 2007 in regards to formal
law versus practice for patent rights). Having laws
on the books may help establish legitimacy with
the global community, but the lack of enforcement
undermines this legitimacy and provides openings
to the type of illicit activities that such laws
attempt to discourage.
To learn how well domestic laws are enforced in
practice, we performed a test of the three key FATF
recommendations comparing national-level com-
pliance as assessed by the FATF to the actual firm-
level practice based on our audit study. The FATF
conducted Mutual Evaluation Reports (MERs) to
determine whether a country is Compliant (C),
Largely Compliant (LC), Partially Compliant (PC),
or Non-Compliant (NC) with each of the 40
Recommendations. The MERs consisted of a com-
bination of questionnaires, onsite inspections, and
plenary discussions of countries’ performance.
Appendix B provides a summary of the FATF MER
assessments, focusing on the three key FATF rec-
ommendations discussed above. FATF MERs were
completed for 156 countries for Recommendation
5, with 72 (46.2%) of the countries being Non-
Compliant, 71 (45.5%) being Partially Compliant,
13 (8.3%) being Largely Compliant, and no coun-
tries being fully Compliant. For Recommendation
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12, 162 countries have MERs data, with 114 (70.4%)
of the countries being Non-Compliant, 44 (27.2%)
being Partially Compliant, 4 (2.5%) being Largely
Compliant, and no countries being fully Compli-
ant. Recommendation 33 had MER data for 160
countries, with 49 (30.6%) of the countries being
Non-Compliant, 85 (53.1%) being Partially Com-
pliant, 20 (12.5%) being Largely Compliant, and 6
(3.8%) being fully Compliant.
While it is helpful to determine the level of
compliance at the national level as measured by the
FATF’s assessment of local laws on the books, the
question arises as to whether this translates to
actual compliance at the firm level among corpo-
rate service providers. Until this study, however, no
audit of individual firm behavior existed to com-
pare to the results of national-level assessments. If
the two correlate highly, the current FATF protocol
may be sufficient. Yet there is good reason to
suspect that the alignment of domestic statutory
compliance with international standards does not
tell the whole story. A central goal of this study,
therefore, is to conduct a firm-level audit study of
corporate service providers to understand levels of
compliance at the crucial locus of behavior, which
we can then compare to the MERs report scores. We
detail the full design of our audit study below, but
for now we point out that national compliance
from MER reports does not significantly predict
firm-level compliance for FATF Recommendations
5 and 12 (see Appendix C). In fact, it predicts
virtually none of the variance. For Recommenda-
tion 33 on beneficial ownership, national compli-
ance is a significant predictor (at the p\0.05 level)
of CSP compliance, but less than 4% of the variance
is explained, offering weak substantive support for
the proposition that statutory law drives firm-level
behavior across the full sample. The disconnect
underscores the importance of the firm-level audit
study, and it also raises questions about why
variation in firm-level compliance may occur. We
thus turn to a discussion of some possible
explanations.
INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT: CONSEQUENCES
VERSUS APPROPRIATENESS
The lack of strong support above raises questions
regarding why some nations may commit to inter-
national standards but then fail to enforce them,
while others fulfill their commitments at signifi-
cant cost. Key parts of the answers lead to a re-
engagement with the discussion of institutional
context previewed above. While behavior in inter-
national business is likely driven in large part by
firm capabilities (Barney, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984)
and industry conditions (Porter, 1980), it is the
various countries’ institutional contexts that deli-
mit both the informal and formal constraints on
managerial actions (Peng et al., 2008) and define
legitimate business behavior (North, 1990). Cant-
well et al. (2010) posit that economic growth is
dependent on the establishment of more advanced
institutions. This requires more effective policies
and regulations. For example, Demirguc-Kunt et al.
(2006) found that incorporated businesses reported
fewer obstacles to growth and operations in coun-
tries with developed institutions. Although govern-
mental efficiency focuses on the effective
implementation of public policy (Galang, 2012),
different institutional factors may influence
whether and how domestic firms adhere to such
policy.
The international business literature has often
focused on two broad types of cross-national insti-
tutional contexts: developed and developing/
emerging (Cantwell et al., 2010; Meyer & Sinani,
2009; Wang, Hong, Kafouros, & Wright, 2012).
Developed contexts demonstrate reliable rule of
law, efficient regulatory frameworks, and high
transparency/low corruption; developing/emerging
institutional contexts evince the opposite condi-
tions (Meyer & Sinani, 2009). This is a useful
typology but, as our research details below, it omits
an important category of jurisdictions that matter a
great deal for international business and finance
but cannot be captured by the dichotomous cate-
gorization of developed versus developing. The
missing type is tax havens, countries that span a
range of socio-economic development levels from
middle- to upper-income but that also display a
distinctive set of legal institutions and norms
relevant to incorporation and international busi-
ness more generally.
Both formal and informal institutions character-
ize all three types of country contexts, but precise
measurement of the effects of formal rules versus
informal norms is difficult given traditional meth-
ods relying on observational data and is therefore
subject to selection bias and collinearity, among
other problems. We thus consider different exper-
imental probes drawn from arguments relating to
the two broad types of institutions.
Formal institutions generally connect to March
and Olsen’s (1998) logic of consequences and infor-
mal institutions relate to their logic of
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appropriateness. The logic of consequences (hereafter
consequences) posits that adherence to laws and
standards occur mainly to avoid penalties or to
achieve some benefit (March & Olsen, 1998);
actions are therefore based on the anticipated
outcomes among alternatives. Consequences applied
internationally holds that actors only obey inter-
national laws and standards to avoid sanctions or
capture gains as dictated by formal rules (Abbott,
Keohane, Moravcsik, Slaughter, & Snidal, 2000;
Goldstein, Kahler, Keohane, & Slaughter, 2000).
These formal global rules may be transposed into
domestic law and implemented via local govern-
ment agencies but only have ‘‘teeth’’ when actively
enforced. As such, national laws and regulation
drive transaction costs (Buckley & Casson, 1976), so
firms should necessarily consider the penalties
attached to violations of the formal rules, while
also evaluating the risks associated with interna-
tional political and policy uncertainty (Miller,
1992).
The decision as to whether or not to comply then
becomes a classic cost–benefit calculation, encom-
passing the real and reputational costs and benefits
that are expected to come about from specific
actions (Checkel, 2001; Drezner, 2007). If the
likelihood of being caught or punished is low, or
the ultimate cost from subsequent punishments is
small, there is limited incentive for a country or
firm to follow international law. When penalties
are minor or extensive delays in due process occur
or can be created, nations may take a ‘shoot first
and ask for forgiveness later’ approach. This tactic
implies that when there are limited costs to doing
so, countries may publicly promise to abide by
international rules but then ignore these commit-
ments to pursue critical economic or security
concerns (Goldsmith & Posner, 2005).
In contrast to consequences, informal practices
characterize the logic of appropriateness (hereafter
appropriateness), which proposes that national
adoption and adherence to international law is a
function of and response to accepted norms (March
& Olsen, 1998). The structure of the international
system is a social structure (Arend, 1997) and is
fundamentally comprised of and based on interna-
tional law.
This system is premised on binding, meaningful
agreements that are themselves critically grounded
on commonly accepted norms and beliefs. It is the
social and moral commitment to the ideals these
rules and laws are based on, not penalties or
benefits, which leads countries to adopt and adhere
to common standards.
Rather than being the product of cost–benefit
calculations, compliance reflects shared norms of
proper conduct, internalized through socialization
within a community and bolstered through social
approbation or disapproval. Trust and reciprocity
reduce risk and uncertainty because codes of con-
duct are institutionalized (Singh, Lentz, & Nijssen,
2011; Stephan & Uhlaner, 2010). The emphasis on
social mechanisms to ensure compliance (Gra-
novetter, 1985) means that when commitments
are not met, punishments take on a more social
nature, such as exclusion from marks of prestige,
ostracism, or expulsion from a group (Thompson,
1996). Checkel (2001) posits that it is through social
learning and persuasion that norms are established
and understood and compliance is achieved. Social
conditioning helps create structures that stabilize
the control and coordination between entities
involved in economic exchange (Redding, 2005).
Interestingly, Coffee (2001) suggests that norms
may matter the most when laws are the weakest.
In the absence of highlighting either the conse-
quences or appropriateness of legal behavior, it is
expected that a basic knowledge of the law should
prompt compliant behavior. The managerial school
of international law (Chayes & Chayes, 1996), here-
after managerial law, maintains that most countries
follow most international rules most of the time.
This is because governments conclude that such
rules advance their interests for bureaucratic
domestic reasons as a compliance machinery is
built up, and because of a general sense of obliga-
tion to fulfill commitments in the international
community. Conversely, non-compliance is
ascribed to actors being ignorant of the applicable
rules, often because the rules themselves are vague
or under-specified.
By shifting the attention to firms (CSPs), rather
than countries in aggregate, we have the opportu-
nity to better understand what influences actual
compliance with international law. In addition to
managerial law, the two opposing theoretical per-
spectives discussed above – consequences and
appropriateness – offer contrasting hypotheses for
firm behavior. According to consequences, sanctions
and punishment should have a greater influence on
firm compliance with standards. This is contrasted
with appropriateness, which proposes that adher-
ence to national, industry, or cultural norms
should better explain firm willingness to comply.
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Since our earlier test shows that the relationship
between national law and compliance at the firm
level is marginal at best, shifting attention to firms
allows us to better determine whether these theo-
ries, or some other factor, can explain which
corporate service providers on average may or
may not behave consistently with national and
international law.
AUDIT STUDY AND FIELD EXPERIMENT
ON COMPLIANCE
To explore firms’ compliance with laws pertaining
to incorporation and transparency, we employ a
first-of-its-kind audit study with an embedded field
experiment, which we conducted between March
2011 and July 2012. One key challenge for studying
whether firms comply with laws comes from the
sensitive nature of this topic. A naturalistic audit
study allows us to overcome this challenge by
improving the overall ecological validity. Moreover,
by including a randomized experimental compo-
nent, we can consider possible explanations for
compliance and provide stronger causal inferences
than would be otherwise possible, especially in
probing the effects of informal norms, formal rules,
and information about international law. This is
particularly relevant in exploring how firms in
countries evincing different institutional contexts
respond to the same experimental interventions.
Using a large sample of 1639 firms drawn from 176
countries further enhances the external validity.
In contrast, a survey approach, in which firms are
directly asked whether they comply with the law,
has obvious limitations with validity and, likely,
reliability. With surveys, the expectation is that
firms, or the individuals within them, when specif-
ically asked in such a fashion, would indicate and
acknowledge that they adhere to all aspects of the
law, even though they may not do so in practice. A
lab setting would also not be appropriate, since it
would be nearly impossible to empanel a proper
pool of respondents or create a setting that would
accurately resemble the principle players and cir-
cumstances for incorporation of firms across the
world. Thus a more natural, field-based audit study
is most appropriate for the topic at hand.
In our study, we are able to create a situation that
does not simply mimic the behavior under consid-
eration, but actually tests such behavior with the
relevant real entities, specifically corporate service
providers across the world. This permits us to
determine whether these providers comply,
particularly when an explicit request is made to
violate the rules, and when participants are primed
with the knowledge of these standards.
We further include a field experimental compo-
nent. Field experiments have seen limited use in
international business research and related fields
and are just beginning to attract heightened interest
as a methodology for exploring complex and diffi-
cult topics in areas such as development economics
(Banerjee & Duflo, 2009; Duflo, Glennerster, &
Kremer, 2008), organizational economics (Bandiera,
Barankay, & Rasul, 2011), behavioral economics
(Harrison & List, 2004; Levitt & List, 2009), strategic
management (Chatterji et al., 2016), and psychol-
ogy (Shadish & Cook, 2009). For this field experi-
ment, we consider the theoretical perspectives
discussed above, managerial law, consequences, and
appropriateness, in designing interventions to learn
whether information, penalties, or accepted norms
are key motivators for compliance behavior across
different institutional contexts.
This design overcomes many of the concerns for
survey and lab experiments because the subjects are
not self-selected into the sample and are unaware
they are being investigated. This issue is particu-
larly important for research in international law,
since most of the studies in this field that have
employed survey or lab experiments (Chilton &
Tingley, 2013; Hyde, 2007) have been subject to the
above criticisms. What is being tested here is the
actual behavior of those involved with the incor-
poration of firms. The scope of this study also gives
it high external validity due to an extensive dataset
that draws on firms from 176 countries from all
economic regions throughout the world. Such
coverage overcomes concerns regarding global gen-
eralizability from a small sample, or one that is
limited in coverage of countries or geographic
regions. Such broad country representation also
allows the sample to be grouped into categories of
developing countries, tax havens, or OECD coun-
tries in a way that enables the exploration of effects
in different institutional contexts. Using well-
established classifications means that the results
can be more confidently generalized within and
across these categories and do not need to be
extrapolated from unmatched samples.
METHODOLOGY
As noted, we employed a global audit study with an
embedded field experiment. Birkinshaw, Bresman,
& Nobel (2010) noted the opportunity, if not need,
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to employ experimental approaches to interna-
tional business research. They indicate that as of
2010, no field experiment had been reported in
JIBS, and there have been very few, if any, since. To
conduct the audit-based experiment, our research-
ers employed aliases and posed as international
consultants desiring to create a confidential shell
corporation in the target country hosting the
incorporation service.
The study thus employed deception, an ethically
vexed and contentious approach. Under the Bel-
mont Report (United States, 1978) standards, decep-
tion can only be justified if the costs are low, the
benefits high, subjects experience no harm or pain,
and there is no other way to conduct the study. All
conditions hold for the present research. On aver-
age, subjects spent 5–10 min responding to inqui-
ries, often with canned language used in
communication with many other customers, so
costs were low. No firm-level data existed before the
study and therefore the scientific and policy ben-
efits of obtaining firm-level information arguably
justified the small amount of time invested by each
of the providers. Because the profit-driven crimes
enabled by untraceable shell companies comprise
serious policy problems that cause a great deal of
harm and human suffering, the social benefits of
learning from the results are high. The data were
fully anonymized so that no adverse consequences
would result to the subjects, and all subjects
answered inquiries in line with their normal day-
to-day routines. Conversely, surveys or other meth-
ods using fully informed consent would likely have
produced biased results, suggesting that the
research could not have been reliably performed
using alternative methods (see Findley, Nielson, &
Sharman, 2015). The study aligns with prominent
articles in social science employing similar meth-
ods (Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2004; Butler &
Broockman, 2011).
We collected information on a large pool of
incorporation services for our sample, and then
conducted an audit study with random assignment
of placebo or treatment conditions to determine
compliance or lack thereof. For the placebo and
treatment conditions (discussed below), varying
information concerning international law regard-
ing incorporation and its motivation was randomly
assigned across the pool. The primary request
across all conditions from our fictitious individual
clients, including the placebo, was for the CSP to
provide its services to create a new corporate entity
that would limit tax and legal liability and
maintain confidentiality. A request for limited
liability, tax savings, and confidentiality does not
violate international standards, only an explicit
request to avoid supplying ID documents, or the
incorporation service provider’s failure to require
such documentation, violates these standards.
Compliance was determined at two levels. First,
did the incorporation firm respond to our email?
Those that did not were adjudged as exhibiting soft
compliance, though as discussed further below,
conceivably non-response could have been the
product of inattention or a commercial logic.
Second, did the firms that responded require the
necessary certified identifying photo documenta-
tion consistent with international standards (hard
compliance for those that did respond)? Because all
of our inquiries, including the placebo, asked what
identity documents, if any, were required, the
determination of whether providers adhered to
identification requirements in line with this query
comprised the audit portion of the study.
The experimental component involved ran-
domly assigning three treatments (FATF, conse-
quences, and appropriateness), which were tested
against a control (the placebo). A reference to
international standards alone appears in the first
treatment (FATF), but then to test the influence of
formal institutions/consequences and informal
norms/appropriateness, we added (not replaced)
language to the international standards reference
that raised the possibility of consequences or the
appropriateness of various norms. These three
experimental conditions thus map to the three
theories discussed above – managerial law, conse-
quences, and appropriateness – and provided infor-
mation about international standards, as well as
incentives or norms to follow those standards. It is
possible that some firms already understood the
standards, which would make the treatment some-
thing more of a prime rather than a pure informa-
tion treatment. Following the audit study, we
conducted a survey and learned that roughly 70%
of firms were not aware of the global standards, but
that more firms in tax havens were aware of these
standards than those in non-tax havens (Findley,
Nielson, & Sharman, 2014).
Corporate service providers were categorized as
residing in OECD, Tax Haven, or Developing
countries according to World Bank and OECD
classifications. This design allowed for the testing
of whether any of the treatments resulted in
significantly different compliance (soft or hard)
compared to the placebo, and whether the
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institutional context of the country in which the
incorporation firm was based influenced the rate of
compliance.
To better create a neutral basis for the national
source of the inquiry, all email requests came from
wealthy, low-corruption OECD country aliases. For
this condition, the consultant claimed to be from
one of a set of wealthy countries (Norway, Finland,
Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, Austria, New
Zealand, or Australia), which we dubbed the
‘‘Norstralia’’ countries for ease of reference. The
Norstralia countries are among the least corrupt
countries ranked on the Transparency Interna-
tional Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). An alias
for each country was created based on the most
common male names in that country.
Placebo
The placebo condition was a basic request for
confidential incorporation, without any reference
to international laws pertaining to incorporation
and transparency. In this treatment, the consultant
specifically inquired only about what documenta-
tion would be required to form a corporation (see
Appendix D for examples of the placebo and
treatment emails and Figure 1 for a graphical
representation of the Treatment Hypotheses).
FATF (Information on Law)
To test the regulatory influence of the relevant
international standards promulgated by the FATF,
the first treatment identified the FATF and perti-
nent international standards. This treatment spec-
ifying the requirement for identity documents was
intended to evaluate whether the basic knowledge
of the law’s existence and requirements influences
whether incorporation firms were more likely to
comply. This intervention thus tests the effects
on compliance of information about the formal
rules. The consultant indicated that he still desired
to limit disclosure and maintain confidentiality
and, as with the placebo condition, specifically
inquired about the documentation required for
incorporation.
As noted, the managerial school of international
law (Chayes & Chayes, 1996) posits that most
countries follow international rules through a sense
of responsibility to satisfy commitments to the
broader international community, andbecause their
interests are best served by so doing. The failure to
comply is attributed to lack of knowledge or under-
standing of relevant rules. This theory leads to the
hypothesis that when given information about
international standards, incorporation services are
more likely to comply with them than when they
have not been primed with such information.
Hypothesis 1: Incorporation firms are more
likely to comply with international standards
when informed of such standards relative to
when they are not informed.
Consequences (Formal Penalties)
The second treatment mentioned international law
and raised issues relevant to consequences (Goldstein
et al., 2000; March & Olsen, 1998). As with the
International Standards treatment, this treatment
provides identical information about FATF and its
recommendations for documentation when form-
ing a corporation. To prime the consequences mech-
anism, this treatment also added that the violation
of these standards may result in legal penalties. The
consultant then subtly indicated a desire to violate
international law by saying that he would prefer to
avoid the disclosure of personal information,
implying confidentiality and non-compliance with
the law. The purpose of this treatment is to
determine how incorporation firms react when
primed with consequences of violating the formal
international standards and law, particularly
whether they are more or less likely to comply
with the law and risk sanctions. Based upon
consequences, the expectation is that the threat
and awareness of punishment would increase the
rate of compliance with international law, relative
to the placebo condition.
Hypothesis 2: Incorporation firms are more
likely to comply with international standards
when informed of sanctions (consequences) for
violating such standards relative to when they are
not informed about such sanctions.
Appropriateness 
(Norms)
Consequences 
(Penalties)
FATF 
(Information 
on Law)
International 
Standards 
Compliance
H1 (+)
H2 (+)
H3 (+)
Figure 1 Treatment model.
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Appropriateness (Informal Norms)
The third treatment draws upon appropriateness by
suggesting that compliance with international law
be based on norms of appropriateness and general
conformity. This treatment expressly primes the
firm by indicating that most countries are signato-
ries with the FATF standards, which require specific
disclosure for incorporation. In addition, the treat-
ment emphasizes that ‘‘as reputable businessmen’’
both the applying firm and incorporation firm
want ‘‘to do the right thing’’ according to interna-
tional standards. Even so, the consultant still asks
for the ability to incorporate by not disclosing
personal information, effectively creating an
anonymous corporation and violating the law.
The appropriateness approach proposes that in order
to conform to generally accepted and shared
expectations for suitable behavior, firms will act
ethically and appropriately. Thus by providing
statements about norms and acceptable practices,
higher compliance is expected over both the
placebo and international law conditions.
Hypothesis 3: Incorporation firms are more
likely to comply with international standards
when exposed to norms of appropriateness for
adhering to such standards relative to when they
are not exposed to these norms.
Host Country Institutional Context
The scope and breadth of this study’s sample allows
for further analysis and insight in addition to the
three treatments. On top of the treatment effects
from the variation in the email message, we are also
able to take into consideration host-country charac-
teristics or institutional context, particularly the
level of development and nature of the country in
which the incorporation service is located and
incorporation is being requested. This distinction is
particularly valuable since it is not expected that
firms across the world behave consistently, as noted
above in the discussion of institutional context, but
instead that national circumstances may influence
the propensity towards compliance to both national
laws and international standards. This allows for
more nuanced tests of institutional theories of
international business. We divided jurisdictions into
three categories: OECD, Developing, and Tax Haven
countries based on World Bank and OECD classifi-
cations. Such categorization reflected the blocking
criterion of country type used to sort firms prior to
random assignment. We pre-registered this intent
before execution of the experiment, and thus the
subgroup analysis is justified under norms of best
methodological practice.
Prior work had indicated that, contrary to popular
perception, firms in tax havens would prove signif-
icantly more compliant with international law than
firms in developing countries and, surprisingly, also
more compliant than firms in developed countries
(Sharman, 2010, 2011). Tax havens were originally
identified by the OECD as those that host companies
are not engaged in substantive business activities,
that apply low or zero tax rates, do not exchange tax
information with other governments, and have little
transparency (OECD, 2009). Tax havens’ relatively
low power in the global system, combined with the
high importance of the incorporation business to
their economies, made them especially vulnerable
should they appear on the FATF black list. These
facts led us to expect quite different behavior from
CSPs in tax havens than in developed or developing
countries. This prior scholarship suggests three
additional hypotheses pertaining to differences
across country groups in terms of institutions’
conditioning overall compliance and sensitivity to
primes regarding international standards (see Fig-
ure 2 for a graphical representation of the Host
country conditions Hypotheses):
Hypothesis 4: We expect CSPs in tax havens to
be more compliant with international standards
than firms in OECD (and developing) countries
(4A). Tax-haven firms should also be more sensi-
tive when informed of international standards
(4B), informed of the consequences for violating
these international standards (4C), and when the
norms of appropriate behavior to follow inter-
national standards are invoked (4D).
Hypothesis 5: We expect CSPs in OECD coun-
tries to be less compliant than firms in tax havens
(5A). OECD firms should also be less sensitive
when informed of international standards (5B),
informed of the consequences for violating these
international standards (5C), and when the
norms of appropriate behavior to follow inter-
national standards are invoked (5D).
Hypothesis 6: We expect that CSPs in develop-
ing countries will be less compliant than firms in
tax havens (6A). Developing country firms should
be less sensitive when informed of international
standards (6B), informed of the consequences for
violating these international standards (6C), and
when the norms of appropriate behavior to fol-
low international standards are invoked (6D).
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Sample
To conduct this study, we needed to create a large
global pool of firms that incorporate companies for
a fee. Information on such firms, particularly at the
international level, has not been compiled and
does not exist in any central database. As a result,
we were required to employ a non-random sam-
pling approach that drew from Internet sources and
governmental data. Some CSPs are well-established
companies or law firms that specialize in incorpo-
ration services, while others provide this function
as part of their general offerings. Although we were
able to procure data from various commercial
listings and governmental sources, our approach
drew heavily on Internet searches.
Given the possibility of the existence of reclusive
incorporation firms and due to the size of this
potential market, it was impossible to obtain infor-
mation on all CSPs. That said, we are confident we
have captured a meaningful percentage of the
accessible incorporation firms. Our sample selection
process generated firms that have a greater public
presence than those that went undetected, whether
intentionally or not. Authorities are therefore more
likely to scrutinize the firms in our sample, which in
turn are expected to have greater compliance than
lower-profile incorporation firms. Although this
may have resulted in a selection bias towards firms
that favor compliance, such a bias would also result
in a more conservative test (and under-report non-
compliance with international law).
Blocking and Random Assignment
For the experiment, prior to the random assign-
ment of firms into control and treatment
categories, we employed a blocking technique to
improve the sample design. Blocking is a proce-
dure that places the sampled firms into naturally
or logically similar groupings based on covariate
values. As a result, the experimental design allows
for results that compare firms with similar charac-
teristics and therefore helps neutralize potential
confounds. Block randomization was thus per-
formed within country categories: OECD, Tax
Haven, or Developing. We also blocked based on
whether the firm was a stand-alone incorporation
service or a law firm. Blocking ensures covariate
balance across experimental conditions and
removes the possibility of high collinearity
between covariates (country or firm type) and
assignment to the various treatments or placebo
(Gerber & Green, 2012).
We then randomly assigned a Norstralia alias (as
mentioned, a putative consultant from Norway,
Finland, Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, Aus-
tria, New Zealand, or Australia) to each email, with
an appropriately localized individual name tied to
the home country. The text and the subject line
were also randomized. The randomization of the
subject line was to help mitigate the risk of
detection, should two associated firms receive
multiple requests. The text of the email represented
the placebo or one of the treatment conditions.
Unique numbers were assigned to each treatment
condition, alias, and email text. We then used
the numbers to randomly assign the conditions
within each block. Individual treatment texts or
subjects lines were not significantly associated with
outcomes, and difference-in-means tests indicated
that there was good blocking covariate balance
Developing 
Countries
Tax
Havens
OECD 
Countries
International 
Standards 
Compliance
H4A (+)
H5A (-)
H4B (+)
H4C (+)
H5B (-) H5C (-)
H6A (-)
H6B (-)
H6C (-)
Tax Havens are more compliant than OECD and Developing Countries (H4A/H5A/H6A)
Treatment Hypotheses: B = FATF (Information on Law), C = Consequences (Penalties), D = Appropriateness (Norms)
H4CD(+)
H5D (-)
H6D (-)
Figure 2 Host country conditions model.
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across experimental conditions. This suggests that
the randomization worked as expected.
Implementation
The study was conducted exclusively through
email, with the target firms receiving either the
placebo or one of the treatments. In consultation
with industry experts, we established that email is
the primary mode of communication for CSPs,
which had the benefit of allowing us to reach a
much larger sample (providers in 176 countries)
than we would have with other forms of commu-
nication. We wrote and sent the emails exclusively
in English because English is the global language of
business, individuals from our set of ‘‘Norstralia’’
countries are assumed to be either fluent or very
proficient in English, and incorporation services are
typically small operations without the capacity to
work in a diverse set of different languages. These
considerations all default to the global business
language of English.
We identified the proper content and tone for
the emails to minimize the risk of suggesting that
this was a scam letter. Ensuring the plausibility of
our email approaches in this manner involved
dozens of onsite interviews with CSPs to establish
typical client profiles, as well as attending and
observing CSP trade conferences in New York,
Miami, London, Hong Kong, Singapore, Switzer-
land, and the Caribbean. To minimize the risk of
detection, we drafted 33 separate emails, each of
which included a salutation, noted brief back-
ground information, signaled the intent for
anonymous incorporation, and asked the service
which materials were necessary to move forward.
These four components were included in all of the
emails and any other material in the email text
was designed to be purely innocuous. While many
experiments hold constant all text except the
treatment material, identical language would have
substantially raised the risk of detection if firms in
the industry forwarded our emails. Within these
emails, we then embedded treatment language,
which was unique to each treatment, for each of
the three conditions specifically noting our aware-
ness of international standards, invoking legal
penalties, or raising appropriate behavior (Ap-
pendix D provides four examples of emails with
specific treatment language highlighted in bold).
Thus we used different email bodies and inserted
the standard treatment language for each condi-
tion, and then in post-estimation tested for letter-
specific fixed effects. While a few of the letter texts
indicated significant fixed effects (as would be
expected by random chance with so many signif-
icance tests), controlling for the imbalances did
not qualitatively change the effects for the exper-
imental conditions. All emails were sent from a
‘‘consultant’’ indicating a desire to incorporate a
firm in pursuit of lower tax obligations, with
limited legal liability, and heightened confiden-
tiality. We then coded the replies to our requests
to determine levels of compliance.
Coding Protocol
Full compliance with FATF standards requires that
in order to incorporate, certified identity docu-
ments, including at least one notarized photo
document, be received and verified, and that this
documentation be retained so that true ownership
can be determined should the need emerge in the
future. The lack of such documentation means that
the actual owners or those who control the com-
pany cannot be identified, which effectively creates
an anonymous corporation that can be used for
illegitimate purposes.
Email responses were coded as either Compliant,
Partially Compliant, or Non-Compliant with interna-
tional standards, or as Refusal of Service. Responses
were deemed Compliant if the incorporation firm
required photo identification that was notarized,
certified, or apostilled. Partially Compliant firms
required photo identification, but did not require
it was notarized or certified. Non-Compliant firms
did not request any form of photo identity docu-
mentation. Incorporation firms that did respond
but refused to offer their services were deemed
Refusal of Service. Firms from which we did not
receive a reply were coded as No Response.
After the incorporation firms responded with the
necessary information, the ‘‘consultant’’ replied
that their ‘‘needs have been met’’ and that the
provider’s services would no longer be necessary,
effectively terminating the relationship. Although
we ended the communication after this correspon-
dence, we are confident that the results would not
have changed had we continued through to official
incorporation. In an earlier audit study, one of the
authors followed up with 45 firms all the way to the
final step and even incorporated (in his own name)
three of the firms in Nevada, Britain, and the
Seychelles (Sharman, 2011). In no case did the
service providers respond in one way initially and
then change their minds in the end before fully
completing the transaction. This impression is
strengthened by the extensive interviews with
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CSPs, who explained that it would be commercially
counter-productive to send mixed messages to
clients as to what documents are required. From
these firms’ point of view, they want customers to
provide all the necessary documentation as soon as
possible to complete the transaction quickly, min-
imizing the time spent completing customer due
diligence.
To prevent subjects from determining that the
emails actually originated from the US, researchers
used proxy servers that assigned random IP
addresses. All identifying information regarding
the CSPs was removed from emails to ensure their
anonymity and prevent harm to subjects. Upon
completion of the study, all identifying informa-
tion was separated from the results and removed so
as to fully cover any trail connecting subjects to the
results.
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
We first consider the overall results of the audit
study. In all, 1070 of 2280 emails (or 46.9%) did not
receive responses. For firms that responded, 203
replies (or 8.9%) were Non-Compliant, 378
responses (or 16.6%) were Partially Compliant,
399 replies (or 17.5%) were fully Compliant, and
230 responses (or 10.1%) refused to offer incorpo-
ration services. The audit results reveal that non-
compliance with international standards is aston-
ishingly high. If one instead calculates the percent-
age Non-Compliant or Partially Compliant, the
results show that 25.5% of firms were not fully
Compliant. When calculated as a percentage of
those responding, a full 48% were not wholly
compliant with international standards.
To understand how these results are distributed
across different country types and therefore distinct
institutional contexts, we computed levels of non-
and partial compliance for the three country cate-
gories. When restricting the sample to firms in
OECD countries only, 27.4% were not fully com-
pliant and of those responding 51.2% were not
fully compliant. In tax haven countries, 23.6% were
not fully compliant and of those responding 35.5%
were not fully compliant. In developing countries,
24.7% are not fully compliant and of those
responding 55.6% were not fully compliant. These
data show that tax havens have a significantly
lower proportion of firms that are out of full
compliance with international standards, whereas
OECD and developing countries are more similar in
compliance levels.
To test our experimental hypotheses using the
data from the field experiment, we conducted a
comparison of means (t tests) of the three treat-
ment conditions against the placebo. We then
stratified the larger sample into the three country
categories (OECD, Tax Haven, and Developing) and
completed a similar comparison of means within
the country blocks. Although the test of the
hypotheses could generally use a one-tailed t test,
we took the more conservative approach and use a
two-tailed test for all our analyses. See Table 1 for
the data and analyses.
While the hypotheses specifically focus on the
treatment effects for compliance with the law, they
could be expanded to also address the relationship
with the other responses. For example, since not
replying might be viewed as a form of soft compli-
ance, one might expect a similar relationship with
no reply as full compliance. Refusal, while not
precisely compliant with the law, indicates an
unwillingness to conduct business with a poten-
tially risky customer and has the same end result as
compliance: no untraceable shell company is pro-
vided. As noted below, although we are unable to
conclusively ascertain the reason for not replying,
an outright refusal is easier to interpret.
Soft Compliance
Firms that did not reply to our initial email request
or to one of the two follow-up communications,
and did not have the email returned undeliverable,
could be deemed as having been in soft compliance.
Since we do not have any details on the reasons for
their not replying, we are unable to conduct more
complete analysis of the motives for such soft
compliance. However, we did perform a non-
response check on all firms that failed to reply to
any of our repeated inquiries. The inquiries basi-
cally asked whether the firm was still in business
and assisting international customers and made no
mention of taxes, legal liability, or confidentiality.
A very small proportion of non-responding firms
replied to this inquiry (less than 5%), suggesting
that soft compliance may not in fact account for
much of response rate beyond the variance across
experimental conditions.
For many of the target firms, we assume that the
potentially dubious nature of the solicitation,
regardless of the placebo or treatment condition,
prompts some firms to simply ignore our request
and not provide an explanation for why, leading to
soft compliance. Out of the overall sample, 1070 of
2280 requests, or 46.9%, did not respond to our
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email. For the total sample, there is no significant
difference between the three treatments and the
placebo for no reply, with all four conditions falling
within 2.6% of the average across all conditions.
For the three country conditions, there is greater
variance for the placebo no reply condition (44.7,
34.8, and 51.1% for OECD, Tax Haven, and Devel-
oping countries, respectively), and these differences
are significant statistically at the p\0.05 level.
Within the country subgroups, for OECD coun-
tries, there is no significant difference between the
placebo and the three treatments for no reply. For
developing countries, the FATF treatment (64.6
versus 51.1%, p\0.01) and the appropriateness
treatment (61.5 versus 51.1%, p\0.05) are signif-
icantly higher than the placebo for no reply. For Tax
Haven countries, we see significant differences in
the non-response rate for all three conditions, with
the FATF treatment having 10% less no reply (24.7
versus 34.8%, p\0.10), the consequences treatment
9.5% higher (p\0.10) and appropriateness 11.9%
lower (p\0.05) than the placebo condition. An
interesting take away from these findings shows
that in Tax Havens significantly more firms reply
(the opposite outcome from no reply) when
informed of international law or norms and less
Table 1 Displays difference in means tests for the total sample, OECD countries, Tax Haven countries, and Developing countries (row
blocks) for the five possible outcomes of no-reply, non-compliant, partial compliant, compliant, and refusal (rows within blocks) for
the Placebo, FATF, Consequences, and Appropriateness experimental conditions (columns)
Response Placebo FAFT (information on law) Sig. Rationalism Sig. Contructivism Sig.
(Penalties) (Norms)
Comparison of means between placebo and treatments - total sample
No reply 44.75% 49.46% 48.63% 50.00% +
Non-compliant 8.42% 8.11% 7.38% 9.78%
Partial compliant 16.65% 16.22% 19.95% 14.13%
Compliant 19.49% 16.76% 16.39% 16.03%
Refusal 10.69% 9.46% 7.65% * 10.05%
Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
n 1057 370 366 368
Comparison of means between placebo and treatments – OECD countries
No reply 44.72% 46.81% 45.06% 52.25%
Non-compliant 13.73% 14.89% 10.99% 11.71%
Partial compliant 15.14% 13.83% 15.39% 11.71%
Compliant 14.09% 8.51% 18.68% 10.81%
Refusal 12.32% 15.96% 9.89% 13.51%
Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
n 284 94 91 111
Comparison of means between placebo and treatments - Tax Haven countries
No Reply 34.78% 25.74% + 45.28% + 22.89% *
Non-Compliant 4.01% 4.95% 3.77% 8.43%
Partial Compliant 15.72% 24.75% * 22.64% 18.07%
Compliant 39.80% 40.59% 23.59% ** 36.15%
Refusal 5.69% 3.96% 4.72% 14.46% **
Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
n 299 101 106 83
Comparison of means between placebo and treatments - developing countries
No reply 51.06% 64.57% ** 52.66% 61.49% *
Non-compliant 8.02% .29% .69% .20%
Partial compliant 18.14% 2.57% + 0.71% 3.79%
Compliant .92% 7.43% 0.65% .77%
Refusal 12.87% 9.14% 8.28% 5.75% *
Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
n 474 175 169 174
Notes: Each entry refers to the percent of subjects in a country block who received a given condition and responded in a certain way. Those percentages
are accompanied by significance tests, which compare the FATF, Consequences, and Appropriateness conditions to the Placebo and identify when they
are meaningfully different outcomes.
Sig. significance of difference between mean of Placebo and each treatment.
+ p\0.10; * p\0.05; ** p\0.01; *** p\0.001.
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when informed of penalties than the placebo
condition.
FATF (Information on Law) Treatment
(Hypothesis 1)
For the FATF treatment, we primed the incorpora-
tion firm with the information that identified FATF
and the pertinent international standards on cor-
porate transparency. Hypothesis 1 states that when
information about international standards and
laws is provided, the CSP is more likely to comply
with them than when no information is provided.
As seen in Table 1, there are no significant differ-
ences between the FATF treatment and the placebo
for the full sample of responses, including full
compliance, failing to support H1. For this treat-
ment, no reply increases from 44.5% in the placebo
to 49.0%, but compliant drops from 18.9% to 16.9%
and refusal (a different sort of compliance) also
declines from 11.2% to 9.5%, but none of these
changes are significant statistically.
Consequences (Penalties) Treatment (Hypothesis
2)
For the Consequences treatment, we provided
similar details with the FATF treatment, but added
information about potential financial penalties
that could result from non-compliance. Hypothesis
2 predicts higher compliance will result when
consequences for violation to international stan-
dards are raised. Only refusal had a significant
change (a decrease to 7.6%, p\0.05), but this is in
the opposite direction as expected, failing to sup-
port this hypothesis (H2). As with the International
Law treatment, no reply increases (to 49.2%) and
Compliant drops (to 16.0%), but neither are signif-
icant changes. These decreases in Compliant and
Refusal seem to be offset by the increase in the no
reply (soft compliance) and Part Compliant.
Appropriateness (Norms) Treatment
(Hypothesis 3)
For the Appropriateness treatment, we appealed to
the target’s sense of doing what is right by suggest-
ing that compliance with international law be
based on norms of appropriateness and general
conformity. The Norms Hypothesis asserts higher
compliance when norms of appropriateness are
invoked, but as with the other two treatments, we
find compliance actually decreases (to 15.5%), but
insignificantly, failing to support H3. We do find a
marginal significantly higher rate for no reply,
which increased to 49.5% (p\0.10). One
explanation may be that ‘‘accepted norms’’ may
be not be universally agreed upon, and as with
culture, may differ across countries (Leung &
Morris, 2015).
These results provide no support for any of the
primary treatment hypotheses and only find a
significant relationship for refusal responses under
the consequences treatment, but in the opposite
direction as expected. Greater insight into why
these relationships are not found may be gained by
stratifying the total sample into country categories
to determine if the nature of the institutional
context in the country in which the CSP is based
affects behavior differently. As noted above, the
field experiment was deliberately designed in the
use of block randomization so that we could test if
firms in OECD, Tax Haven, and Developing coun-
tries responded differently to our treatments.
Tax Haven Countries (Hypothesis 4)
We hypothesized that CSPs in tax haven countries
are less likely to violate international law and have
higher compliance than firms in OECD and devel-
oping countries (H4A). We also hypothesized that,
when informed of international standards (H4B),
informed of the consequences for violating these
international standards (H4C), and when the
norms of appropriate behavior to follow interna-
tional standards are appealed to (H4D), tax havens
would be more sensitive to these prompts priming
international law. The overall soft compliance rates
(no reply) were significantly lower in tax havens
than OECD and Developing countries (33.5 versus
46.6 and 55.5%, respectively). This means that CSPs
in tax havens were more likely to respond to our
requests than in OECD countries and developing
countries. Nearly two-thirds of tax-haven firms
responded, in contrast to less than half of develop-
ing country firms. It seems like the increased
response rate is found in a significantly higher
compliance rate (36.5% for tax havens versus
13.3% for OECD countries and 9.6% for developing
countries). Firms in tax havens are nearly three
times more likely to be fully compliant than firms
in OECD countries and nearly four times more
likely than firms in developing countries. Although
CSPs in tax havens have lower refusal rates than in
OECD and developing countries, this seems a result
of much higher compliance rates, supporting H4A.
Within the tax haven countries, we find that for
the International Law treatment, the no reply rate is
marginally significantly lower (p\0.10) and the
partial compliant rate significantly higher (p\0.05)
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than the placebo condition, but we do not find
much of a change in full compliance. In contrast, for
the consequences treatment, the no reply rate margin-
ally significantly increases (p\0.10) and the com-
pliant rate significantly drops (p\0.01). For the
appropriateness treatment, no reply is also signifi-
cantly lower (p\0.05) and the refusal rate is
significantly higher (p\0.01). When informed of
international law, tax-haven firms respond to our
request more often and have increasing partial, but
not full compliance. When informed of penalties,
hard compliance drops, but this seems to be
because of a shift to the soft compliance of not
responding to our request. When accepted norms
are invoked, more firms respond, but then explic-
itly refuse to do business with us. Interestingly,
while just out of marginal significance (p\0.11),
the penalties condition encourages higher partial
compliance and the norms condition results in
higher non-compliance. These results provide some
support for Hypothesis 4 considering CSPs in tax
havens, which demonstrated significantly higher
compliance with global standards and more sensi-
tivity to prompts about those standards than firms
in OECD and developing countries.
OECD Countries (Hypothesis 5)
Hypothesis 5 predicted that, compared to tax
havens, CSPs based in OECD countries would be
less likely to comply with international standards
(H5A) and would prove less sensitive when
informed of international standards (H5B),
informed of the consequences for violating these
international standards (H5C), and when the
norms of appropriate behavior to follow interna-
tional standards are appealed to (H5D). While there
is some variance seen across the treatments when
considering response rates, there are no significant
differences between the placebo condition and any
of the treatments for all five outcome measures,
offering only support for Hypothesis 5A.
Developing Countries (Hypothesis 6)
As discussed above, developing countries face dif-
ferent pressures than OECD and tax-haven coun-
tries. While they are pressured to accept the same
global norms for laws and transparency, they may
neither have the resources to enforce the laws, nor
be dissuaded by potential penalties. Thus the
Developing Country Hypothesis proposed that,
compared to firms in tax havens, incorporation
firms in developing countries should be less likely
to comply with international standards (H6A) and
be less sensitive when informed of international
standards (H6B), when notified of the conse-
quences for violating these international standards
(H6C), and when the request appeals to norms of
appropriate behavior in following international
standards (H6D). While we find support for H6A,
we find that none of the conditions create a
significant change in full compliance over the
placebo. We do find that when informed of inter-
national law, developing country firms are less
likely to even respond, with no reply increasing
from 51.1 to 64.6% (p\0.01), and are less likely to
be partially compliant, decreasing from 18.1 to
12.6% (p\0.10). The penalties condition results
in no significant changes. The norms condition
also exhibited a significant increase in no reply (to
61.5%, p\0.05) and a significant drop in refusal
from 12.9 to 5.8% (p\0.05). Firms in developing
countries appear more sensitive to the priming
conditions than firms in OECD countries, but the
sensitivity we do see appears to cut in opposite
directions from firms in tax havens.
The results of these comparison-in-means tests
are robust qualitatively to logistic regression anal-
ysis, considering each outcome category separately
with the other outcomes as the comparison sets.
Additionally, although it has not yet become
standard practice in social science or business
studies, statistical best methods recommend the
employment of corrections for multiple compar-
isons given that significant results at the p\0.05
level should be expected in one of twenty tests
based on chance alone. We therefore made use of
two methods to adjust for multiple comparisons.
We employed the more conservative family-wise-
error-rate adjustment using the Bonferroni method
(Dunn, 1961), and we also controlled for the false-
discovery rate with the less draconian Benjamini–
Hochberg procedure (Benjamini & Hochberg,
1995). As is common, many of the results did not
clear the amended critical p-value thresholds for
significance, but other key results held. Notably, for
the tax haven subgroup, the effects were robust to
both multiple testing corrections of the norms
treatment in significantly increasing refusal rates
and the penalties condition in significantly decreas-
ing the compliance rate (presumably because the
firms that would otherwise have proved compliant
did not reply).6
All told, the subgroup analysis provides support
for the importance of institutional context, partic-
ularly regarding tax havens. Firms in tax havens
were significantly more compliant than firms in
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OECD or developing countries and significantly
more sensitive to prompts regarding international
law, formal penalties for violating the standards,
and informal norms enjoining conformity. These
results underscore the need for studies that are
sensitive to institutional context but also for more
nuanced categorization of countries according to
their rule of law and position in the global econ-
omy, at least considering tax havens as a distinct
category when studying international finance,
incorporation, and law.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The audit study and accompanying field experi-
ment offer interesting results and important impli-
cations for scholars and national policymakers. We
first considered overall levels of firms’ compliance
and found that they neither match well the FATF
national level assessments, nor do they offer a
particularly optimistic view about financial and
legal institutions in global corporate governance.
This key finding from the audit study extends
beyond our earlier work (Findley et al., 2014),
which was almost exclusively experimental and
focused on different experimental treatments,
specifically ones related to terrorism, corruption,
the IRS, and offering a premium. In particular it
extends the work to a careful consideration of the
importance of institutional context in conditioning
compliance with global corporate transparency
standards.
As shown by the 2016 Panama Papers scandal
and this article, it seems that the efforts the
international community is putting into improving
corporate transparency are not generally working.
It also appears that it is not very difficult to create
an anonymous shell corporation. While it is ini-
tially encouraging that nearly 75% of the total
sample of incorporation firms either did not reply,
proved fully compliant, or refused service, that still
leaves roughly 25% of these firms that do not
comply or are only partially compliant. The infer-
ence is that, should potential criminals wish to set
up an untraceable shell company, all they need to
do is shop around and they would succeed, on
average, within four attempts.
We then divided the sample to learn whether
national characteristics help explain behavior, con-
sistent with institutional arguments in interna-
tional business. We found compelling evidence for
institutional differences across country types. For
OECD countries, the lack of significant changes in
any responses across the three treatments was
unexpected and concerning. These countries’
claims to be leading the way in adhering to the
global rules they created to counter money laun-
dering and associated crimes does not find evidence
in the data. The overall full compliance rate for
OECD countries is 13.8%, which is higher than the
9.6% for developing countries, but is significantly
lower than Tax Havens (36.5%). With 27.4% of
incorporation firms either being non-compliant or
only partially compliant, it apparently does not
take much effort to set up an anonymous shell
corporation in an OECD country.
In contrast, firms in tax havens, where we
initially expected greater challenges to setting up
an untraceable shell corporation, had actual com-
pliance rates of more than a third, and had the
lowest non-compliance rate of any category (4.8
versus 13.1% for OECD countries and 7.9% for
developing countries). Incorporation firms in Tax
Havens are thus found to be more likely to comply
with international law for incorporation. One
explanation may be that small, vulnerable tax
haven countries and firms are responding to the
increased scrutiny from the rest of the world by
improving corporate governance and transparency
(Sharman, 2010, 2011).
For the experimental portion of the study, we
hypothesized that CSPs, when given information
about international law, potential penalties, and
generally accepted norms, would be more likely to
comply with the law. We found that this is not the
case on the whole. In fact, when primed about
international law, penalties, and norms, compli-
ance to the law and refusal to proceed with our
request actually decreased, something we did not
expect. We did find that in all three treatments, the
incorporation firm’s soft compliance, as measured
by the rate of non-response, did increase, but only
with marginal significance for the appropriateness
treatment. It seems that these treatments did not
significantly increase the likelihood for hard com-
pliance to international laws across all country
groups.
However, for the treatment effects in tax havens,
the no reply was marginally to highly significant for
all three treatments, with a decrease in no reply for
the FATF and appropriateness treatments, but an
increase for the consequences treatment. For the
latter, it appears that the increase in non-response
came out of a decrease in compliance. One defen-
sible inference is that otherwise compliant firms in
tax havens, when informed of penalties, are
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basically ignoring our requests and not responding.
In contrast, when primed with acceptable norms,
tax haven firms are more likely to respond, but also
more likely to refuse service outright, perhaps in
response to the apparent disingenuousness of the
appeal to appropriateness.
Although the tax havens provide the most
intriguing results and those most consistent with
institutional theories of international business,
incorporation firms in developing countries also
provide some interesting insights. Developing
countries had the highest overall no reply rate
(55.5%), and within this category, the international
law and norms treatments had even significantly
higher non-response rates over the placebo. Overall
compliance rates were low (9.6%) in developing
countries and the treatments did not significantly
improve compliance but rather, in multiple cases,
worsened adherence to global standards. This
might be explained as resulting from these coun-
tries’ lack of resources or incentives to enforce
international law.
One key implication of our findings is that OECD
countries need to do more to get their own houses
in order. Our study argues that the low overall rate
of compliance and the practical ease of obtaining
prohibited shell companies in OECD countries does
not call for new laws, but for re-doubled efforts to
make these laws effective.
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
Although the use of an audit study with embedded
field experiment helps overcome many concerns
that might be leveled at other methodologies that
might be used to study this phenomenon, such as
surveys or lab studies, other limitations for this
study should be identified. As noted above, our
sample selection relied heavily on Internet searches
to compile a subject pool of CSPs around the world,
since no database for such firms is available. We
recognize that we were unable to document the
complete population of CSPs, but are comfort-
able with the sample we ultimately developed. We
were able to create a large sample of firms involved
with providing incorporation services with broad
coverage in terms of countries and regions. The
blocking and randomization process did not favor
any type of firm, country, or region, allowing high
confidence in and strong generalization from the
results. In addition, since the firms we were able to
identify are more visible, we believe our sample
provides for a more conservative test, since we
suspect that firms that may intentionally be diffi-
cult to find are more likely to violate international
law.
Due to the nature of our field study, we were
unable to further explore or better understand the
logic for why a firm did not reply. There may have
been an element of soft compliance, but a follow-
up round of communication did not offer strong
evidence of this. For the tax haven countries, the no
reply rate varied significantly, from as low as 22.9%
for appropriateness to as high as 45.3% for conse-
quences, so we are confident that the treatments did
affect the firm’s propensity to reply and which
response they provided. Such variance for no reply
had implications on other responses, and gaining a
better grasp for why a firm did not reply would be
helpful to further understand the treatment effects
in light of selection into response.
We recognize that the client profiles we use in
this study are from developed countries, limiting
the conclusions we can draw accordingly. This
design was intentional to ensure consistency from
the incorporating firm perspective. While it is
expected that there is a wide variety of potential
customers wishing to set up shell companies, in
setting up our customer profiles we have aimed to
replicate a reasonably typical shell-company buyer.
In particular, one interested in limited liability, tax
minimization, and confidentiality/secrecy from a
developed country. Future research could further
explore the implications from having the incorpo-
rating entity based in a wider range of countries,
including developing countries.
While we adopted the conventional country
classifications of OECD, Tax Haven, and Developing
countries to segment our sample and test our
hypotheses, there are other categories that would
also be interesting to consider. Future research could
see if the standard of law, whether civil or common,
has an influence on compliance or results in differ-
ent subgroup effects for the treatments. Future
research could also consider whether there is a price
premium associated with violating international
incorporation standards and whether the treatments
cause change to the cost of incorporation.
Although email is the standard mode of commu-
nication for this type of transaction, phone or in-
person contact occurs to a lesser extent. Inferences
from our approach, while capturing the dominant
mode of communication, should not be made for
non-email correspondence.
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Finally, what became of Vadim Mikerin? He was
arrested on October 29, 2014 and was charged with
soliciting bribes from lobbyists. He agreed to plead
guilty to 20 charges of money laundering and
bribery. These bribes and other payments, esti-
mated to be worth $1.7 million, were allegedly
funneled through shell corporations; shell corpo-
rations that could have been set up anonymously
in as few as four attempts.
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NOTES
1If the latter purposes are intended, anonymity and
lack of transparency is desired and generally necessary
to succeed. Here is where the challenge for national
and international policymakers comes into play. To
highlight this challenge, a group of United States
Senators issued a report in 2013 on ways to stop the
laundering of ‘‘blood money’’ from drug traffickers
(United States Senate Caucus on International Nar-
cotics Control, 2013). One of the key recommenda-
tions was to make it more difficult for criminal groups
to set up and use shell corporations to launder their
money in the US and throughout the global financial
system. The report concludes that ‘‘it is far too easy for
US corporations to have ‘hidden owners’’’ (p. 24) and
notes concerns that an anonymous corporation can be
set up using less information than is required to open a
bank account or get a driver’s license. National
governments want the domestic corporate entities
that have been granted legal status, rights and
privileges to follow clear rules in their creation and
subsequent behavior. They should be ongoing con-
cerns with real business activities and there should also
be a clear and certified knowledge of who created the
entity, who the current corporate officers are, and how
to contact them. Laws are enacted, and hopefully
enforced, to ensure these things are accomplished for
the establishment and monitoring of corporations. At
the international level, standards have been created so
that general consistency across country law and
practice is encouraged and maintained. This allows
for greater reliability within and across countries and
can help address the added concerns and loss of
control that may come about when dealing with cross
border activities, particularly illicit ones.
2In April 2016, a leak of 11.5 million documents
regarding over 200,000 offshore accounts from the
Panamanian corporate service provider and law firm
Mossack Fonseca revealed the widespread use of
shell companies for tax avoidance, evasion of inter-
national sanctions, money laundering, and fraud.
Several heads of state and their associates, as well as
wealthy individuals were implicated in the docu-
ments. While many were not actually engaged in
illegal activities, their use of shell companies to
shelter or hide certain activities and funds came as
an embarrassment and exposed the pervasive use of
shell corporations.
3See Appendix A for definition of key terms.
4Private shell companies represent the vast majority
of shell companies. To highlight this point, there are
nearly 6000 companies collectively listed on the NYSE
and NASDAQ stock exchanges, but more than
800,000 companies incorporated in the British Virgin
Islands alone. Firms that list publicly have to meet
exacting disclosure and reporting requirement. Private
shell companies, the target of recent global regulatory
initiatives and the focus of our article, are not. Fortune
500 companies and their smaller counterparts are
engaged in producing substantive goods and services,
whereas the large majority of shell companies do not,
hence the ‘‘shell’’ moniker.
5The FATF standards were slightly modified in
February 2012 and the various recommendations re-
numbered. The substance of both these international
standards and the domestic laws of key jurisdictions
remained constant across the period of the audit
study, MERS, and field experiment. Post-2012, Rec-
ommendations 5, 12, and 33 became 10, 22 and 24,
respectively.
6For developing countries, the significant decrease
in refusal rates for the norms condition survived the
Benjamini–Hochberg correction but not the Bonfer-
roni adjustment, as did the increase in no-reply rates in
the norms condition. The increase in non-response to
the FATF condition in developing countries proved
robust to both multiple-testing corrections.
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Anonymous shell corporation A shell corporation for which the beneficial (real) owner has been been disguised, generally in order
to operate without the scrutiny of law enforcement and public. The term shell corporation and shell
company is used interchangeably in the manuscript
Compliant CSPs were deemed compliant if they required photo identification that was notarized/certified to
complete the incorporation
Corporate service provider
(CSP)
A firm or sole proprietor that can incorporate a company on behalf of its founding members and can
also act as the resident agent for the company
Developing countries A country in which the majority lives on far less money – with far fewer basic public services – than the
population in highly industrialized countries
Field experiment A scientific methodology that experimentally examines an intervention in naturally occurring
environments (real world), rather than in the laboratory
Financial action task force
(FATF)
An international organization created by the world’s leading economic powers to counter money
laundering, was created to promote and enforce corporate transparency standards worldwide
Logic of consequences Adherence to laws and standards occurs only to avoid penalties or to achieve some benefit (March &
Olsen, 1998)
Logic of appropriateness Adherence to international law is a function of and response to accepted norms (March & Olsen,
1998)
Mutual evaluation reports
(MERs)
Assessments conducted by FATF to determine whether a country is compliant (C), largely compliant
(LC), partially compliant (PC), and non-compliant (NC) with each of the 40 Recommendations
Managerial School of
International Law
Most countries follow most international rules most of the time (Chayes & Chayes, 1996)
No response Firms from which we did not receive a reply were coded as no response
Non-compliant CSPs were deemed non-compliant if they did not request any photo identity to complete the
incorporation
Norstralian countries Wealthy, low-corruption OECD countries (Norway, Finland, Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands,
Austria, New Zealand, or Australia). The Norstralian countries are among the least corrupt countries
ranked on the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) and are where the
consultants in our study claimed to be from
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Appendix B provides a summary of the FATF
MERs for countries throughout the world, focusing
on the three key FATF recommendations. They
provide four outcome categories, and the
table shows the distribution of compliance levels
across the countries and recommendations. Only a
small percentage of countries were Largely Com-
pliant and only Recommendation 33 had any
countries identified as fully Compliant. The vast
majority of country audits indicated either Non-
Compliance or Partial Compliance with the trans-
parency standards.
Appendix C shows the results of regression
analysis considering whether national level com-
pliance with each of the recommendations predicts
firm level compliance. Each of the
‘‘Recommendation’’ variables is an ordered scale
ranging from non-compliance to full compliance
(1 = non-compliant, 2 = partially compliant,
3 = largely compliant, and 4 = compliant) for
national level assessments and predict percent
firm-level compliance. The model is estimated
using ordinary least squares regression analysis.
National compliance does not predict firm-level
compliance for FATF Recommendations 5 and 12
and predicts virtually none of the variance. For
Recommendation 33, national compliance is a
significant predictor (at the p\0.05 level), but less
than 4% of the variance is explained, offering weak
substantive support for the proposition that statu-
tory law drives firm-level behavior across the full
sample.
OECD countries A collection of 34 countries with the world’s most advanced and developed economies that have committed to
enact and enforce its standards for transparency in corporate governance. These countries adhere to the rule of law
and have relatively well-funded, capable judicial, regulatory and law enforcement
Partially
compliant
CSPs were deemed partially compliant if they requested photo identification to complete the incorporation, but did
not ask the it be notorized/certified
Refusal of
Service
Incorporation firms that did respond, but refused to offer their services were deemed Refusal of Service
Tax Havens Countries identified by the OECD as those that host companies not engaged in substantive business activities, that
apply low or zero tax rates, do not exchange tax information with other governments, and have little transparency
APPENDIX B: SUMMARY OF FAFT MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORTS AUDITS
Recommendation 10 Recommendation 22 Recommendation 24
Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage
Non-compliant 72 46.2% 114 70.4% 49 30.6%
Partially compliant 71 45.5% 44 27.2% 85 53.1%
Largely compliant 13 8.3% 4 2.5% 20 12.5%
Compliant 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 6 3.8%
Total 156 100.0% 162 100.0% 160 100.0%
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Constant 0.579 (0.070) 0.495 (0.066) 0.385 (0.66)
Recommendation 10 -0.039 (0.039)
Recommendation 22 0.014 (0.046)
Recommendation 24 0.063 (0.030)
R2 0.0010 0.0009 0.0399
Adj. R2 -0.0001 -0.0087 0.031
F 0.990 0.090 2.060*
N 102 106 104
+ p\0.10; * p\0.05; ** p\0.01; *** p\0.001
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APPENDIX D: EXAMPLE EMAILS USED
IN STUDY
Control (Placebo) Email
Dear [name/company]
I am contacting you as I would like to form an
international corporation for my consulting firm. I
am a resident of [Norstralia] and have been doing
some international consulting for various compa-
nies. We are now growing to a size that make
incorporation seem like a wise option. A lot of our
newer business is in your region.
My two associates and I are accustomed to paying
[Norstralia] income taxes, but the rising tax rates
make incorporation in another country a more
economical alternative. Also, our contracts grow
larger and more complicated, so reducing personal
liability through incorporation seems more
attractive.
As I am sure you understand, business confiden-
tiality is very important to me and my associates.
We desire to incorporation as confidentially as we
can. Please inform us what documentation and
paperwork is required and how much these services
will cost?
I would like to start the process of incorporation
as soon as possible. Also, how much can we expect
your fees to be?
Due to numerous professional commitments, I
would prefer to communicate through email. I
hope to hear from your soon.
Thank you very much, [alias]
Treatment Email: International Standard
Dear [name/company]
I am contacting you regarding a business I am trying
to set up. I am a consultant and my colleagues and I
are seeking to establish an international corpora-
tion. I am [Norstralia] resident, but I do business
both locally and with some international clients,
including some in your region. Out business has
been growing substantially, and our goal is to limit
tax obligations and business liability.
We would like as much business confidentiality
as possible in these early stages of formation. My
internet searches show that the international
Financial Action Task Force requires disclosure of
identifying information. But I would rather not
provide any detailed personal information, if
possible.
So, we would like to know what identifying
documents will be required to establish this com-
pany. We would also like to know what start-up
costs will be.
Due to my travel schedule, email will be the best
way to reach me. I look forward to hearing from
you soon.
Regards, [alias]
Treatment Email: Consequences
Dear [name/company]
I am seeking information on how to incorporate an
international company. I hope you might be able
to offer what I need.
I am a consultant, and my colleagues and I live in
[Norstralia]. Much of our business originates here,
where we operate, but our company also grows
quickly among international clients. Many of them
are in your area. So, we feel that incorporation is a
necessary option of us. We hope to limit taxes
obligations and business liability.
We would like to know if you feel that you will be
able to service us with a corporation. What iden-
tifying documents will you request for this trans-
action? We would prefer to limit disclosure as much
as possible.
My internet searches show that the international
Financial Action Task Force sets standards for
disclosure of identifying information when form-
ing a company. I also understand that legal
penalties may follow violation of these standards.
But I would like to avoid providing any detailed
personal information if possible. If you could
answer these questions and also let us know about
your prices, we very much appreciate it.
Thank you for the time to address our query.
Business obligations make communication diffi-
cult, so we would prefer to correspond with email.
Until we speak again, [alias]
Treatment Email: Appropriateness
Dear [name/company]
I ama residentof [Norstralia] andwould like to inquire
about your process to form international corpora-
tions. With several associates, I operate a consulting
firm in [Norstralia].Wedealwitha growingnumberof
international clients,many that come fromyour area,
and would like to pursue incorporation option for
liability and taxes purposes.
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We are particularly concerned with keeping busi-
ness interactions private; thus, we are eager to limit
information disclosure as much as possible. My
internet searches show that the international Finan-
cial Action Task Force sets standards for disclosure
of identifying information when forming a com-
pany and most countries have signed on to these
standards. As reputable businessmen, I am sure we
both want to do the right thing by the international
rules. But I would like to avoid providing any
detailed personal information if possible.
Can you please inform me what your start-up
costs are and what kind of identification or docu-
ments we will need to provide? We are all fairly
burdened with commitments, so email communi-
cation is preferable.
Thank you in advance, [alias]
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